Iran Threatened to Cut Undersea Cables — The Internet's Throat Runs Through Hormuz
Iran has signaled both cable destruction and tolls on lines through the Strait of Hormuz. More than 95% of global internet traffic moves over submarine cables. We unpack the structural beneficiaries — Starlink, AST SpaceMobile, and the UAE bypass pipeline.
- Iran has signaled both destruction and tolls on submarine cables under the Strait of Hormuz, while more than 95% of global internet traffic rides those cables — and the 2022 Houthi cuts off Yemen already proved a 25% Red Sea traffic drop, putting data infrastructure on par with oil as a pressure point
- Starlink reads as strait-independent emergency backup, AST SpaceMobile aims at replacing the underlying infrastructure via direct-to-phone connection, and the UAE bypass pipeline plays the same role on the energy side
95% of global data rides submarine cables · Starlink is structurally immune · what AST SpaceMobile's direct-to-phone connection means.
On April 22, a senior IRGC officer broke the silence: Iran could destroy submarine cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz. By May 9 it went further, with a proposal to charge tolls on cables crossing the strait. The press treated this as an extension of oil supply-chain risk. The real threat sits somewhere else.
Few people know what is laid under the Strait of Hormuz
More than 95% of global internet traffic flows over submarine cables. Not satellite, not wireless — fiber laid along the seabed. The Strait of Hormuz is the choke point through which one of the core Asia-Europe-Middle East routes passes.
In 2022, when Houthi forces severed three submarine cables off Yemen, internet traffic routed through the Red Sea fell 25%. Repair was not fully complete months later. There are only about 60 cable-repair vessels worldwide, and repair work in contested waters tangles insurance, safety, and diplomacy at once.
If Iran actually touches the cables, certain regions will feel data flow being cut before they feel any oil disruption.
Why Starlink is structurally immune to this risk
Starlink runs more than 6,400 low-Earth-orbit satellites. It crosses no strait. No country can charge a toll on satellite orbits. When ground infrastructure collapsed in the Ukraine war, Starlink was the only network that kept working — that is the live test for this technology.
It is a misread, however, to treat Starlink as a full replacement for submarine cables. Latency is higher and it has structural limits for high-volume enterprise traffic. The realistic positioning is emergency-backup infrastructure — insurance for ships, remote regions, and conflict zones when cables are cut. The price of that insurance is rising right now.
AST SpaceMobile — what Starlink can't do
Starlink needs a dedicated terminal. AST SpaceMobile is different — it connects directly to existing smartphones. The architecture aims at broadband from anywhere on Earth without separate hardware.
Why this matters: the dependency on submarine cables is an infrastructure problem, not a device problem. If the cable goes, no terminal is good enough. As AST SpaceMobile commercializes, it pushes toward removing the infrastructure dependency itself. Early days, but the direction is different. If Starlink is emergency backup, AST SpaceMobile is aiming at replacing the foundation infrastructure.
The UAE already knew the answer
On the energy side, the country that solved this first was the UAE. ADNOC already operates an onshore pipeline from Abu Dhabi to Fujairah that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz. Japan's purchase of UAE crude through this route shows the practical demand.
The harder Iran presses, the more economic value this bypass route accrues. The same logic applies to data infrastructure. Investment in onshore cable routing diversification that bypasses the strait is structurally accelerating.
The structure, in plain view
Reading the Hormuz risk only as oil-supply disruption is half the picture. Energy and data move under the same strait, and both are exposed to the same single-country pressure point — that is the real fragility this episode exposed.
The beneficiary structure is clear. The value of infrastructure that does not depend on the strait rises. Starlink already sits in that position; AST SpaceMobile aims at a deeper replacement; the UAE bypass pipeline plays the same role on the energy side. Geopolitical risk becomes the trigger for revaluing certain pieces of infrastructure. This is one of those moments.
ASTSFrequently Asked Questions
Could Iran actually cut the submarine cables?
Technically yes. Submarine cables are physically vulnerable, and shallow-water strait sections are even more so. That said, doing so means absorbing international-law violations, diplomatic fallout, and retaliation risk — an extreme choice. The Houthi cable cuts in the Red Sea are the precedent.
Why can't Starlink fully replace submarine cables?
Latency and bandwidth. Submarine cables deliver near-light-speed latency and terabit-class bandwidth. Starlink LEO satellites have low latency by satellite standards but still higher than cable, and there are capacity limits when handling large enterprise data traffic.
When does AST SpaceMobile commercialize?
Commercial service launched in the US and select countries in 2025 and is expanding. Full global coverage will take several more years. Satellite launch cadence and carrier partnerships are the key variables.
How exposed is Korea to this risk?
A meaningful share of international internet traffic from Korea uses submarine cables that route through East and Southeast Asia toward the Middle East and Europe. If Hormuz-routed cables are cut, some traffic delay is possible until alternative routes are secured. Starlink launching its Korea service in December 2025 can be read in that context.
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